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ABSTRACT
The collective bargaining over working conditions of employees in the 
Public Administration service finds a number of features that in some 
cases do not always have a clear legal protection and in others, they have 
some specific characteristics exclusively in the public sector, thus making 
it necessary to proceed to its analysis.




This article, written following an analytical methodology, with legal analysis 
for legislation and jurisprudence, and hermeneutics methodology, with legal 
interpretation of the issues raised, aims to deepen the knowledge of some 
factors that particularise collective bargaining over working conditions in the 
public sector, specifically in terms of legitimacy to negotiate and limitations 
to the negotiating field.
In order to analyse some of the peculiarities of the process of collective 
bargaining over working conditions of employees in the service of the Public 
Administration in Spain, it is necessary to know a number of things:
First: In Spain, following the mandate laid down in Article 37 of our 
Constitution, namely: ‘The Law will guarantee the right to collective labour 
bargaining between representatives of workers and employers as well as to 
the binding force of the agreements’, collective bargaining is to be regulated 
by Royal Decree Law 2/2015, of October 23 by which the revised text of the 
Law of the Statute of Workers, hereinafter SW, is approved.
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The SW gives its Title III, Articles 82 to 92 to organise the collective bargaining 
process and to regulate the figure of collective agreements. Thus, it is 
necessary to understand that there is no other channel to achieve the 
collective bargaining ‘labour’ agreement but rather the channel provided 
by its own SW. Collective agreements which comply with the procedure 
stipulated by the SW, will have regulatory efficiency while, on the contrary, 
if the negotiating parties do not agree to negotiate in accordance with the 
criteria determined by the SW, the ‘in theory’ resulting agreements will have 
no binding force beyond the compulsory nature typical of a signed contract 
inter partes.
From the foregoing, the collective agreement regulator of working conditions 
is a statutory collective agreement.
Second: When identifying the parties entitled to promote the negotiation 
of a collective agreement, SW Article 87 comes to distinguish two areas or 
two different areas, namely: one, corresponding to collective Company 
agreements, business groups or group workers with specific professional 
profile; and the other, corresponding to sectoral agreements.
Whenever the Public Administration holds in its contractual relationship 
with their working civil servants a position of company, the test for standing 
under SW Article 87, for which we would have to choose is the first of those 
described above, i.e. the company.
Third: In the field of Public Administration when workers are identified as 
service providers, we use the term public servants/employees. Within civil 
servants, Article 8.2 of Legislative Royal Decree 5/2015 of 30 October, by 
which the revised text of the Law of the Basic Statute of Public Employees 
is approved, hereinafter BSPE, is to distinguish four types of employees, 
namely: civil servants, acting officials, labour staff and temporary staff. Of 
these, a hired labour personnel is understood to be that hired according to 
any of the procedures laid down in labour legislation.
Fourth: In collective bargaining, the BSPE endows Articles 31 to 38, Chapter 
IV, to regulate the collective bargaining process involving public employees, 
without their differentiation among the different existing modes of public 
employees while its Article 32.1 specifically states that ‘collective bargaining, 
representation, and participation of public employees with employment 
contract shall be governed by labour legislation, without prejudice to the 
provisions of this chapter expressly applicable to them.’
Starting from the exposed ends we have to understand that the regulatory 
framework of the collective bargaining process for employees at the service 
of the Public Administration, is sorted on the basis of the SW, bearing in mind 
the particularities provided by the BSPE.
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What are the particular or differentiating elements of the collective bargaining 
process presented by the public sector versus the private sector?
Without being the only differentiating factors, we will make two basic 
assumptions, namely: the identification of persons authorised to negotiate 
and the setting of specific restrictions on the contents of the collective 
agreement, specifically on remuneration.
2 Identification of the Persons Authorised to Negotiate a 
Collective Agreement of the Public Administration
According to the SW Article 87, the Works Council, the staff representatives 
or union sections which, as a whole, join the majority of the members of the 
Works Council, are entitled to negotiate collective company agreements, 
on the side of workers. This approach, which would put the Administration 
as a legitimate part of the Company side, should not raise any controversy, 
if not because, in practice, it is not accepted as a decisive criterion for 
identifying the persons authorised in the negotiation processes carried out 
in the public sector. Faced with SW Article 87.1 cited above, BSPE Article 33.1 
foresees that collective bargaining of working conditions of civil servants is 
carried out ‘through the exercise of representative recognised unions…’, 
approach that leads to recognise the legitimacy representing the workers, 
the most representative trade union representatives, approach typical of the 
negotiation at the supra business level or sectorial level.
The first thing we would deduce from a textual reading of BSPE Article 33 
is that we have a criterion of legitimacy that is not widely applicable to all 
public employees but exclusively to civil servants so, in regard to staff labour, 
it would result from applying the rule of SW Article 87.1, which recognises 
as legitimate in the negotiation, first, the bodies of unitary representation, 
namely, staff delegates and works councils. While this criterion is originally 
adopted by the Spanish Case Law (see judgments of the Supreme Court of 
February 15, 1993, December 20, 1995 and July 7, 1997), it is not the only 
line with existing jurisprudence, highlighting a second line in the opposite 
direction that came to recognise the legitimacy exclusively to trade unions 
(see judgments of the Supreme Court of December 15, 1994, April 30, 1996, 
and June 21, 1996).
The presence of these opposing positions and legal uncertainty of them 
derived, ends leading to the judgment of the same body, of December 21, 
19991, which diverges from the criteria of SW Article 87.1, recognising the 
existence of a ‘peculiar negotiation unit’. To this end and bearing in mind 
the provisions of the aforementioned judgment, it has to be from a mixed 
approach under which we adopt collective bargaining at the enterprise 
level, the criterion of business standing, while we adopt collective 
bargaining at the sectoral level or supra business level, the legitimacy 
1 RJ/2000/528
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of the workers’ representatives. Therefore, the rules differ depending on the 
legitimacy of the parties concerned, applying the criteria of SW Article 87.1 
on the company side and SW Article 87.2 (coinciding with BSPE Article 33.1) 
on the workers.
This configuration of a mixed negotiating unit, recognised mainly by the 
Spanish Case Law from the 1999 ruling, clashes with the lack of a legal 
mandate to justify it, since it cannot be grounded through BSPE Article 33, 
especially when it only mentions civil servants. It is not the competence of our 
courts the ex novo creation of a legal norm, especially when the recognised 
criterion is entirely unrelated to the rules of legitimacy provided by the SW.
On the other hand, despite the recognition made by the Supreme Court in 
its 1999 ruling by which the rule of legitimacy ‘can find exceptions in those 
cases where the organisational structure of the entities in the bargaining 
unit is relatively simple’ (Sala Franco, Blasco Pellicer, & Altés Tarrega, 2001, 
p. 19), the reality is that recognising the legitimacy negotiating for the 
most representative trade unions, has been confirmed as the prevailing 
rule; recognition, I come to understand, is justified by the vagueness of the 
‘relatively simple’ expression.
3 Fixing the Contents of Specific Restrictions of the 
Collective Agreement: The Remuneration System
Facing generic recognition where in matters of collective bargaining Article 
37 of the Spanish Constitution carries out, the Constitutional Court has 
come to recognise the possibility of introducing restrictions on collective 
bargaining2. In this respect, concerning the employees at the service of the 
Public Administration, the BSPE has come to order some materials, sorting 
what must be known and respected by the collective agreements. Among 
these materials we can emphasise access to public employment and selective 
systems, the provision of posts and mobility, disciplinary measures or plans of 
equality, to name some subjects. However, one of the most relevant subjects 
that composes it is the remuneration system.
In this regard, BSPE Article 27 provides that ‘the remuneration of the 
workforce shall be determined in accordance with labour legislation, the 
collective agreement that is applicable and the employment contract, always 
respecting the provisions of Article 21 of this Statute’. In this regard, BSPE 
Article 21.2 foresees that the remuneration amounts provided for by the 
agreement may not be subject to increases higher than those expected 
annually in the Law on State Budget. Thus, through collective bargaining the 
distribution of the compensation burden between different wage concepts 
can be estimated without thereby posing salary increases higher than those 
expected annually in the Law on State Budget.
2 STC 210/1990, 20.12.
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In any case, the limitations are valued on the salary mass which is not 
equivalent to recognise that wage increases should be linear between all 
workers. Therefore, we must play with two elements, namely: what do we 
mean by total payroll? How is it operated on the salary mass?
Salary mass shall mean the set of wage compensations and fringe benefits 
as well as the costs of social action accrued during the previous financial 
year, excepting in any case compensation for suspension or termination 
of the employment relationship as well as those resulting from transfers, 
supplemented expenses and contributions to the Social Security of which the 
company is in charge of as well as benefits and compensations of the Social 
Security (Torrents Margalef, 2007, p. 1283).
As to the second question, a limit to the maximum of the salary mass is 
recognised but not how to proceed to the distribution of this mass, which 
will be conditional to what is determined through the collective bargaining 
process. With them, the increases and salary adjustments are not of a linear 
character.
The lack of respect to control over the increases of the salary mass beyond 
the limitations arising from the Budget Act, will determine the illegality of 
the agreement.
4 Conclusions
In spite of starting from a recognition of the channels provided for in SW 
Chapter III with respect to computing processes of collective bargaining and its 
substantiation in the collective agreement, the reality is that the negotiation 
process within the public sector presents a series of particularities that come 
even in the field of legitimation to set up ex novo an ordering rule devoid of 
explicit regulatory support.
It is not understood in this sense that, after the successive legal reforms, a 
change in the standing determination of who holds the parties has not been 
made. For this reason, it would be advisable to rephrase the wording of SW 
Article 87 or recognise a specific regulation on legitimation, through BSPE.
On the other hand, as to the limitations on the contents under negotiation 
it is clear that it cannot recognise freedom of negotiation as an absolute 
principle but, on the contrary, it is subject to a number of limitations that do 
not operate implicitly, but present an explicit recognition.
The recognition of an express limitation to salary increases based on the 
provisions of the Law on General State Budgets may ask us discussion points 
in view of the lack of specification of the kind of administrative entity to 
which it is applied. Obviously it has repercussions on any administrative entity 
but it is true that the economic solvency posed by different administrations, 
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especially regional, is not the same. Therefore, a uniform limiting criterion, 
beyond the duty to control spending, may result in some discriminatory form.
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POVZETEK
1.04 Strokovni članek
Analiza nekaterih neodgovorjenih vprašanj, ki se 
postavljajo ob kolektivnem pogajanju o pogojih dela v 
javnem sektorju v Španiji
V skladu z določilom iz 37. člena Ustave, ki pravi: »Zakon mora zajamčiti pravico 
do kolektivnih delovnih pogajanj med zastopniki delavcev in delodajalcev 
kot tudi zavezujočo veljavo pogodb,« naj bi v Španiji kolektivno pogajanje 
urejal Kraljevi zakonski odlok 2/2015 z dne 23. oktobra, na podlagi katerega 
se odobri spremenjeno besedilo Zakona o delovnih razmerjih, v nadaljnjem 
besedilu: SW. SW ureja postopek kolektivnega pogajanja.
Na področju javne uprave postopek kolektivnega pogajanja upošteva 
posebnosti, ki so predvidene v Temeljnem zakonu o javnih uslužbencih, v 
nadaljnjem besedilu: BSPE.
Četudi izhajamo iz priznavanja metod, ki so predvidene v III. poglavju SW za 
postopke kolektivnega pogajanja in utemeljitve le-tega v kolektivni pogodbi, v 
resnici postopek pogajanja v javnem sektorju omogoča vrsto posebnosti, ki se 
izenačijo pri priznavanju legitimnosti, tako da se vzpostavi uredbeno pravilo 
brez izrecne regulativne podpore.
Špansko pravo priznava obstoj »posebne pogajalske enote«, ko govorimo o 
javnem sektorju: mešane pogajalske enote. Ta enota ni skladna z merilom, ki 
ga priznava SW. V skladu s tem, upoštevajoč člen 87.1 SW, člen 33.1 BSPE 
predvideva, da se kolektivno pogajanje o delovnih pogojih javnih uslužbencev 
izvaja »z uveljavljanjem reprezentativnih priznanih sindikatov ...«, kar je 
pristop, ki vodi k priznavanju legitimnosti za zastopanje delavcev, najbolj 
reprezentativnih zastopnikov sindikata, tj. pristop, za katerega je značilno 
pogajanje na nadpodjetniški ali sektorski ravni.
Po drugi strani pa se glede na omejitve vsebine pogajanj zunaj obsega 
SW višina nadomestila, določena v pogodbi, ne sme povečati za več, kot 
je predvideno letno v Zakonu o državnem proračunu. To pomeni, da je s 
kolektivnim pogajanjem mogoče oceniti porazdelitev bremena nadomestila 
med različnimi plačnimi koncepti, ne da bi prišlo do povečanja plačne mase 
nad zneskom, ki je letno predviden v Zakonu o državnem proračunu. Če se 
ne upošteva nadzor povečanja plačne mase glede na omejitve, ki izhajajo iz 
Zakona o proračunu, je pogodba nezakonita.
